Peguam Negara Malaysia v. MKINI Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor 470 [2021] 2 MLRA The 2nd Respondent [134] Having found the 1st respondent guilty of contempt, we will now deal with the case against the 2nd respondent. The application by the applicant lodges similar complaint against both the 1st and the 2nd respondents. To recapitulate, the complaint is that both of them facilitated the publication of the impugned comments. Whilst s 114A of the Evidence Act has been invoked against the 1st respondent, we do not find this similar invocation may be made against the 2nd respondent. [135] Section 114A of the Evidence Act provides three types of presumptions of fact in publication of contents on the internet. The wordings in s 114A(1) clearly establish the following requirements: i. A person’s name, photograph or pseudonym (‘identity’); ii. The identity must appear on any publication depicting the said person to have some connection with the publication either as the owner, host, administrator, editor or sub-editor of the publication; and iii. The said person will be presumed to have facilitated in publishing or republishing the contents of the publication unless and until the contrary is proved. (See: YB Dato’ Haji Husam Musa v. Mohd Faisal Rohban Ahmad [2015] 2 MLRA 492; Ahmad Abd Jalil lwn. PP [2014] MLRHU 1409; Stanislaus J Vincent Cross v. Ganesan Vyramutoo & Anor [2021] 1 MLRH 459; and Yusof Holmes Abdullah v. PP [2019] MLRHU 1009). [136] The issue to be determined is whether the applicant has established any of the above three requirements of s 114A(1) against the 2nd respondent. No fact or evidence was adduced that the name of the 2nd respondent had appeared on Malaysiakini in such a way that can be attributed to facilitating the publication of the contemptuous comments. There was no evidence tendered that the 2nd respondent’s name appears on the publication of the impugned comments to attract a presumption under s 114A. [137] The wordings of s 114A(1) are very clear and unambiguous to warrant other interpretations. It is also settled that when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to its plain meaning. It is not competent for a judge to modify the language of an Act in order to bring it in accordance with his views of what is right or reasonable. (See: Abel v. Lee [1871] LR 6 CP 365; and Navaradnam v. Suppian Chettiar [1973] 1 MLRA 687). [138] There was no evidence before us that the 2nd respondent was at all material times named as the owner or the host or the editor on the online news portal owned by the 1st respondent; and that there was no evidence before us that he is the person who reserves the sole discretion to edit or completely remove any comments by a third party. In our view therefore, s 114A(1) could not be extended to the 2nd respondent.