[2021] 2 MLRA Peguam Negara Malaysia v. MKINI Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor 437 or the Judiciary. The alleged contemnor’s subjective intention was difficult to establish since it entailed an inquiry into the inner workings of the alleged contemnor’s mind. Thus, it would not matter whether the publisher intended the result. It, therefore, was no defence for the publisher to claim that he did not know if the statements would have the effect of undermining or erode the public in the administration of justice. (paras 123-125) (6) The 1st respondent did not comply with the Communications and Multimedia Content Code (Content Code). Far from complying with the Content Code, Malaysiakini might have breached the Content Code’s fundamental objective. The Content Code in s 2.0 of Part 1 imposed a duty on the 1st respondent as an Internet Content Host (ICH) to ensure to the best of its ability that its content and comments contained no abusive or discriminatory material. The precautionary measures taken by the 1st respondent were inadequate to shield itself from liability. The 1st respondent also could not invoke s 3(3) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (“CMA”) to say that they were not allowed internet censorship in order to absolve their responsibilities. Both CMA and the Content Code viewed wholly have the overriding purpose of not only promoting self-regulation by internet service or content providers but also to regulate and ensure that communications that took place on each information platform did not violate the fundamental rights enjoyed by others. A proper balance must be struck between the freedom of speech and expression enunciated and guaranteed in art 10 of the Federal Constitution and the need to protect the dignity and integrity of the courts and the Judiciary. On the facts, a case of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt had been made out against the 1st respondent, and the charge for facilitating the publication of the impugned comments against the 1st respondent had been proven. (paras 127-132) (7) No evidence was adduced that the name of the 2nd respondent had appeared on Malaysiakini in such a way that could be attributed to facilitating the publication of the contemptuous comments. There was no evidence tendered that the 2nd respondent’s name appeared on the publication of the impugned comments to attract a presumption under s 114A. There was no evidence that the 2nd respondent was at all material times named as the owner or the host or the editor on the online news portal owned by the 1st respondent and that there was no evidence that he was the person who reserved the sole discretion to edit or completely remove any comments by a third party. (paras 136-138) (8) In meting out an appropriate sentence in contempt proceedings, the relevant factors to be considered would include the culpability of the contemnor, the nature and gravity of the contempt, the seriousness of the occasion on which the contempt was committed, the type and extent of dissemination of the contemptuous statements and the importance of deterring wouldbe contemnors from following suit. In the present case, the comments were scurrilous and reprehensible. The unwarranted attack was incendiary, which exposed the Judiciary to embarrassment, public scandal, contempt and to