Niemela v. Malamas Page 6 ANALYSIS [14] Niemela Application for Injunction against Google An unusual aspect of Mr. Niemela’s application for an interlocutory injunction against Google is that it is made in the Malamas Action in which Google is not a party, rather than in the Google Action. Mr. Niemela appears to have adopted this approach in reliance on Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063. That case recognizes that in extraordinary circumstances a non-party may be compelled to take steps to prevent continuing breaches of court orders by parties to an action (at para. 133). [15] Google asserts that Mr. Niemla should have brought his application in the action in which Google is a party, and says he cannot in any event be in a stronger position vis-à-vis an interlocutory injunction in the Malamas Action than would be the case if he had sought an interlocutory injunction in the Google Action. I agree with that submission. [16] In any event, I conclude that whether brought against Google as a party in the Google Action or in the Malamas Action against Google as a non-party, the applicant has failed to establish that it is just and equitable to grant the interlocutory injunction sought against Google. [17] The three-fold test for the granting of an interlocutory injunction is well known. The applicant must establish that there is a fair question to be tried, that he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, and that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 at 334. [18] However, this general test cannot be applied in the context of a defamation claim for the reasons given by Bastarache J. speaking for the majority in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 at paras. 47-48: 2015 BCSC 1024 (CanLII) 1.