Case: 21-51178 Document: 00516474571 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/16/2022 No. 21-51178 thoughts, under the condition of being answerable . . . for false, malicious, and seditious expressions, whether spoken or written”). The Platforms neither challenge this understanding of the First Amendment’s original meaning nor suggest that Section 7 runs afoul of it. This apparent concession is unsurprising. First, Section 7 does not operate as a prior restraint on the Platforms’ speech—even if one accepts their characterization of censorship as speech. Recall Blackstone’s criticism of prior restraints: that they “subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.” 4 Blackstone, supra, at *151–52. The Platforms operate “the modern public square,” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737, and it is they—not the government—who seek to defend viewpoint-based censorship in this litigation. Second, Section 7 does not prevent anyone from expressing their good-faith opinions on matters of public concern. Precisely the opposite: Section 7 protects Texans’ ability to freely express a diverse set of opinions through one of the most important communications mediums used in that State. And it leaves the Platforms free to similarly opine: They can still say whatever they want (or decline to say anything) about any post by any user. Moreover, Section 7’s exceptions—where viewpoint-based censorship is still permitted, like certain specific threats of violence—contemplate malicious, bad-faith speech not protected by the First Amendment as originally understood. See Campbell, Emergence of Neutrality, supra, at 878. So Section 7’s carveouts do nothing to impugn its constitutionality under the First Amendment’s original meaning. C. Rather than mount any challenge under the original public meaning of the First Amendment, the Platforms instead focus their attention on 19