The state also suggests that we construe the statute to refer only to substantial invasions of privacy, which is in line with the parameters set forth in the caselaw above. Consistent with that suggestion, the state recommends that we sever the negligence standard from the statute, arguing, “There are no apparent reasons to doubt that the Legislature would have enacted the statute without the negligence standard.” Again, the constitutional defect in Minn. Stat. § 617.261 stems from its lack of an intent-to-harm requirement and its use of a negligence mens rea. Correcting that defect would require us to rewrite the statute. We would have to sever the negligence mens rea standards from subdivision 1(2) and (3) of Minn. Stat. § 617.261. Doing so would limit the statute’s reach to those who knew both that the person depicted in the image did not consent to the dissemination and that the image was obtained or created under circumstances indicating that the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Such circumstances could show intent to harm. See State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997) (stating that because intent is a state of mind, it is “generally proved circumstantially—by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances,” and that when considering circumstantial evidence of intent, “the jury may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions”). Although severing the negligence mens rea standards would limit the statute’s reach to circumstances in which the disseminator intended harm—consistent with Minnesota caselaw upholding First Amendment proscriptions based on the state’s legitimate harmpreventing interest—it would also result in a statute that classifies an intentionally harmful 27