MATÚZ v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 7 d. Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society i. The principles established by the Court’s case-law 31. The central issue which falls to be determined is whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The fundamental principles in that regard are well established in the Court’s case-law and have been summarised as follows (see, among other authorities, Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 52, Series A no. 323; Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, § 46, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI; and Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 87, ECHR 2005-II): (α) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb; such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”. Freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10, is subject to a number of exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any exceptions must be convincingly established. (β) The adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. (γ) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully or in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it is “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. 32. The Court also observes that the present case bears a certain resemblance to the cases Fuentes Bobo (cited above) and Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland (no. 20436/02, 16 July 2009) in which it found violations of Article 10 in respect of journalists who had publicly criticised the public television broadcaster. Likewise, in the present case, the applicant, a journalist, wrote a book in criticism of the conduct of his supervisors and employer. Therefore this case also raises the problem of how the limits of loyalty of journalists working for such companies should be delineated and, in consequence, what restrictions can be imposed on them in public debate.