904-NMS-1220-15-F4.DOC Sullivan,14 for its proposition that a public official cannot recover damages in a defamation action unless he proves with convincing clarity that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false. This standard has been generally applied to public figures, but I will for the present, set this to one side since Sullivan seems to me to be closely hinged on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. Mr. Basu’s reliance on Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors.15 may be more appropriate. That seems to me to be a case closer to our conception of the law in the field, though the law it states is somewhat different, as Radhakrishnan J noticed, from our own standard. I do not think this distinction is material, given the facts of this case. The House of Lords in Reynolds inter alia reviewed the law from other jurisdictions, including ours: it referenced the Supreme Court decision in Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu,16 to much the same effect as Sullivan in relation to public officials. Now if there is no doubt, and I do not think there can be any doubt, that the NSE is very much a public body, then this standard must apply. In that situation, a demonstration that the defendant acted after a reasonable verification of the facts is sufficient to dislodge a claim for an injunction and a charge of malice. In dismissing the appeal, Nicholls LJ, upholding the decision of Bingham LJ of the court below, 17 did not accept that there should be a shift in the burden of proof, i.e., that the burden should be on the plaintiff for that would turn the law of qualified privilege on its head. It is for he who asserts privilege to prove it. 14 15 16 17 376 US 254 [2001] 2 AC 127 : [1999] 4 All ER 609 (1994) 6 SCC 632 Hope LJ dissenting. 22 of 30 ::: Uploaded on - 10/09/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 03/02/2020 18:08:37 :::