Case 4:16-cr-40070-KES Document 262 Filed 02/17/17 Page 5 of 11 PageID #: 897 DISCUSSION I. Agent Fair conducted a search of Hulscher’s iPhone. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The government, however, argues that Agent Fair never conducted a search of Hulscher’s iPhone. Docket 255 at 1-2. The government argues Agent Fair merely conducted a subsequent viewing of evidence that had already been seized.1 Id. Thus, the issue before the court is whether a subsequent viewing of a copy of electronic data from a cell phone constitutes a search when the data was collected under a valid search warrant and was unresponsive to that warrant. This specific fact scenario is relatively new to Fourth Amendment analysis, and as noted by Professor Orin Kerr, “[e]xisting precedents dealing with the treatment of copies of seized property are surprisingly difficult to find.” Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, 562 (2005). Despite the lack of precedent on how courts should treat digital copies of electronic information, “[t]here are two obvious choices: courts can treat searches of copies just like searches of originals or else treat copies merely as data stored on government-owned property.” Id. Here, the government argues for the latter. The government argues that cell phone data can be shared among law enforcement agencies like a box of physical evidence. Hulscher’s brief appears only to object to the search of the non-segregated, nonresponsive data (Exhibit E). See Docket 224 at 5, 7, 9, and 10. Because the parties’ disagreement is limited to the complete, unsegregated data, the court limits the application of this opinion to the data in dispute. 1 5