SAVVA TERENTYEV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 15 extremely harsh (see paragraph 18 above). The Government thus argued that, in view of the adduced evidence, the domestic courts had been justified in their finding that the applicant’s comment could not have been regarded as a criticism of law-enforcement agencies, even expressed in a harsh form, but had aimed at inciting hatred and enmity as it had humiliated the dignity of the police officers as a group and had publicly called for violence against them. 49. The Government also argued that the impugned comment had been a “pure harsh abuse of police officers” and had not contributed to any public discussion. They stressed that the applicant’s comment had been generalised, aggressive and aimed at turning a reader against a specific social group – police officers, and therefore the applicant’s actions had undoubtedly posed a danger to society. In their view, the authorities’ tolerance of such abusive expressions in respect of representatives of law-enforcement agencies could undermine the latter’s authority and encourage the public to disregard them and disobey their orders. They furthermore pointed out that the relevant national legislation had conferred on the applicant the right to complain about any actions or omissions of a police officer if he considered that his rights or interests had been breached by such actions or omissions; however, he had never lodged any such complaints but had chosen instead to resort to a public appeal to have police officers physically exterminated. 50. The Government further pointed out that the applicant had been sentenced to a suspended term of one year’s imprisonment, and contended that the penalty imposed could not regarded as disproportionate. B. The Court’s assessment 1. Admissibility 51. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 2. Merits 52. The parties agreed that there had been an “interference” with the applicant’s exercise of his freedom of expression on account of his conviction. Such interferences infringe Article 10 of the Convention unless they satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of that provision. It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims as defined in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve those aims.