Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) vs Union Of India on 26 September, 2018 guarantees of life, liberty and freedom are founded. At a descriptive level, privacy postulates a bundle of entitlements and interests which lie at the foundation of ordered liberty. 323. Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the plurality and diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of the human being. S.A. Bobde, J. : 407. Undoubtedly, privacy exists, as the foregoing demonstrates, as a verifiable fact in all civilised societies. But privacy does not stop at being merely a descriptive claim. It also embodies a normative one. The normative case for privacy is intuitively simple. Nature has clothed man, amongst other things, with dignity and liberty so that he may be free to do what he will consistent with the freedom of another and to develop his faculties to the fullest measure necessary to live in happiness and peace. The Constitution, through its Part III, enumerates many of these freedoms and their corresponding rights as fundamental rights. Privacy is an essential condition for the exercise of most of these freedoms. Ex facie, every right which is integral to the constitutional rights to dignity, life, personal liberty and freedom, as indeed the right to privacy is, must itself be regarded as a fundamental right. 408. Though he did not use the name of privacy, it is clear that it is what J.S. Mill took to be indispensable to the existence of the general reservoir of liberty that democracies are expected to reserve to their citizens. In the introduction to his seminal On Liberty (1859), he characterised freedom in the following way: This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/127517806/ 67