03/02/2020 Donovan v Gibbons [2014] EWHC 3406 (QB) (21 October 2014) 21. The premise of the exercise is that there is one single correct meaning, as Diplock LJ explained in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 at 171-2: Libel is concerned with the meaning of words. Everyone outside a court of law recognises that words are imprecise instruments for communicating the thoughts of one man to another. The same words may be understood by one man in a different meaning from that in which they are understood by another and both meanings may be different from that which the author of the words intended to convey. But the notion that the same words should bear different meanings to different men and that more than one meaning should be "right" conflicts with the whole training of a lawyer. Words are the tools of his trade. He uses them to define legal rights and duties. They do not achieve that purpose unless there can be attributed to them a single meaning as the "right" meaning. And so the argument between lawyers as to the meaning of words starts with the unexpressed major premise that any particular combination of words has one meaning which is not necessarily the same as that intended by him who published them or understood by any of those who read them but is capable of ascertainment as being the "right" meaning by the adjudicator to whom the law confides the responsibility of determining it. That is what makes the meaning ascribed to words for the purposes of the tort of libel so artificial. 22. The claimant's pleaded meaning (Particulars of Claim para 8) is that the claimant recklessly and callously placed the safety of children at risk by selling a dangerous pony as being suitable for use with children when she must have known it was not. The defendant's Control Risks meaning (Defence, para 8) in support of the plea of comment is that it is scandalous that the claimant sold the dangerous pony shown in the video as being suitable for children. I am not, of course, confined by the meanings pleaded by the parties: Johnson v League Publications [2014] EWHC 874 (QB) at [5]. Ms Jolliffe's position is that the material complained of is not defamatory, but that if I find it is, then she takes her stand on the meaning to which I have just referred. 23. Mr Dean submits that the material complained of means more than simply the business imputation which I have already considered, and that there is also a plain attack on the personal character of the claimant. 24. The way in which he puts it is this. The video shows a pony which is obviously dangerous to ride, particularly for children. There is no suggestion in the video or the accompanying text that the pony's behaviour was anything other than its typical behaviour under normal conditions. Of course, the person watching the video will have realised that it could not have been behaving like that on the occasion when it was sold, because in that case, the defendant would not have bought it. But there is no suggestion that it bucked and reared only in exceptional circumstances. That being so, the claimant must have been aware of its behaviour at the time of sale, and must have known that it was not suitable for children. And it was that knowledge, he argues, that merits the adverbs 'recklessly' and 'callously' as descriptors of her behaviour. Moreover, he submits that the use of the word 'scandal', which in normal circumstances smacks of comment, tends to reinforce the conclusion that the seller knew at the time of sale that the pony was dangerous and unsuitable for children. Otherwise there would be nothing particularly scandalous about her behaviour. 25. Ms Jolliffe characterises the words 'dangerous' and 'scandal' as expression of opinion about the safety of the product, published in the context of a customer's review, and submits that there is nothing in the words which of itself imputes a fact about the state of mind of the seller. The reasonable reader would know and appreciate that products, particularly animals, which are sold can later turn out to be unfit for purpose or indeed dangerous. For a consumer to express her dissatisfaction at that state of affairs does not, without more, impute that the seller either knew or must have known that the product was dangerous or unfit for purpose or that she was reckless or callous in the sale. She gave the example of a kettle which, after a couple of days of use, starts sparking dangerously when switched on. If the buyer posted a video of the sparking kettle, saying it was dangerous, plainly there would (without more) be no imputation that the seller knew it was dangerous at the time of sale. The person watching the video would assume that the problem had developed afterwards. I accept that. www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2014/3406.html 5/6