12 ANNEN v. GERMANY - JUDGMENT 3. The Court’s assessment 50. The Court considers, and it was not disputed by the Government, that the civil injunction issued by the national courts amounted to an “interference” with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. Such interference will infringe the Convention if it does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It should therefore be determined whether it was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve those aims. 51. The Court finds, and this is common ground between the parties, that the interference was prescribed by section 823 § 1 in conjunction with section 1004 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above), and that the Civil Courts’ decisions were designed to protect “the reputation or rights of others”, namely the reputation and personality rights of Dr M. and Dr. R. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. (a) General principles 52. The fundamental principles concerning the question of whether an interference with freedom of expression is “necessary in a democratic society” are well established in the Court’s case-law and have recently been summarised as follows (see Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 131, 16 June 2015 with further references): “(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which ... must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly ... (ii) The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.