Price v. City of N.Y. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) municipality's employees interact, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Cash, 654 F.3d at 334. 16 17 on the legality of the defendant's actions." Id. (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). *17 3. Qualified Immunity B. Analysis The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials from civil liability so long as their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see generally Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, *16 1152 (2018); Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2017). 1. Malicious Prosecution Claims Simmons and the City of New York The Court first considers Plaintiff's § 1983 malicious prosecution claims against Simmons and the City of New York. The tort of malicious prosecution "remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007). The elements of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 are derived from applicable state law. See Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Conway v. Vill. of Mount Kisco, 750 F.2d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 1984)). For a constitutional right to be "clearly established," "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). "In other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). If the law is "clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since [ ] reasonably competent public official[s] should know the law governing [their] conduct." Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19). But "[e]ven where the plaintiff's federal rights and the scope of the official's permissible conduct are clearly established, the qualified immunity defense protects a government actor if it was 'objectively reasonable' for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act." Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641). "The objective reasonableness test is met — and the defendant is entitled to immunity — if 'officers of reasonable competence could disagree' Against 18 Under New York law, to state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (i) the defendant initiated or continued a prosecution against the plaintiff, (ii) the defendant lacked probable cause to commence the proceeding or believe the proceeding could succeed, (iii) the defendant acted with malice, and (iv) the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002). A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires the additional element of (v) "a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights." Rohman v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000). This element can be satisfied where, for instance, a plaintiff was remanded pending trial, see Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1995), or where a plaintiff was compelled to return to court before dismissal of the criminal charge, see Swartz, 704 F.3d at 112. *18 In their motion, the City Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff's allegations have satisfied the first four elements of the claim. Instead, they argue that "Plaintiff's single court appearance does 8