defence advanced by Mr. Hansman. Respectfully, that is not how the analysis must be [134] In my opinion, the plaintiff in the proceeding (here, Mr. Neufeld) must first overcome a merits-based hurdle, by demonstrating that there are “grounds to believe” that the proceeding has substantial merit (PPPA, s. 4(2)(a)(i)) and that the applicant under the PPPA (here, Mr. Hansman) “has no valid defence in the proceeding” (PPPA, s. 4(2)(a)(ii)). Only once this is shown does the court have to determine whether the plaintiff has established that the harm likely to have been or to be suffered by him or her as a result of the applicant’s expression is serious enough that the public interest in continuing the proceeding outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression (s. 4(2)(b)). Section 4(2)(b) of the PPPA is the final step of the analysis. If the plaintiff fails to show that the applicant has no valid defence, the underlying claim must be dismissed and there is no need to conduct the weighing exercise mandated by s. 4(2)(b) (Pointes, at para. 58). [135] My colleague asserts without explanation (and without citing any supporting authorities) that the “order in which a judge chooses to address each of the elements under s. 4(2) is, of course, at the discretion of the court” (para. 53). In doing so, she is effectively ignoring our Court’s recent decision in Pointes. [136] It is clear from Pointes that the merits-based hurdle must be overcome before the court analyzes the public interest hurdle. The need to conduct the analysis in this order influenced how our Court defined the “substantial merit” standard in Pointes. 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) conducted (Pointes, at paras. 18 and 61-63).