[165] The fact that Mr. Neufeld was re-elected as trustee may be a mitigating where a defamatory statement is not believed, damages can be awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the injured feelings, psychological impact and inconvenience caused by the libel (Bent, at para. 149; Downard, at §14.01[2][f] and [h]). Likewise, the fact that Mr. Neufeld was not silenced by Mr. Hansman’s statements does not negate any harm he suffered. Otherwise, public figures could claim only nominal damages for defamation unless they lost their platform as a result. That is not, nor has it ever been, the state of the law. Granted, the fact that a plaintiff has shied away from the public sphere as a consequence of defamatory remarks can certainly increase the damages awarded, but this is not the yardstick by which harm is measured. [166] In my opinion, given the aggravating factors discussed above, the seriousness of Mr. Neufeld’s harm should have been situated somewhere between the middle and the high end of the scale. The Public Interest in Allowing Mr. Neufeld’s Claim to Proceed to Trial Outweighs the Public Interest in Protecting Mr. Hansman’s Expression [167] Because of the subsidiary nature of this issue, the chambers judge gave little consideration to the competing public interests. He briefly noted that Mr. Hansman’s expression deserved “significant protection” because many of his statements pertained to the need for inclusive and safe schools or did not mention 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) factor, but it does not nullify his claim, nor does it render his harm minor. Even in cases