counter-speech, interpreting s. 4 of the PPPA so as to deprive defamed parties who debate. It could prevent those who hold controversial or unpopular views from entering the public arena to share them. This conclusion does not turn the concept of chilling effect on its head, contrary to what my colleague contends (para. 77). My colleague asserts that our Court’s jurisprudence on this concept “addresses the concern that the possible imposition of a legal penalty would cause speakers to refrain from commenting on matters of public interest” (para. 77). However, the deprivation, through a court order, of a party’s right to vindicate a legitimate claim also imposes a legal penalty on that party. [176] I therefore agree with the Court of Appeal that the chambers judge erred in failing to consider the chilling effect that the dismissal of Mr. Neufeld’s claim might have on future expression by others (Pointes, at para. 80; C.A. reasons, at para. 65). [177] Anti-SLAPP legislation like the PPPA does not provide a licence to defame (Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., 2023 ONCA 129, 478 D.L.R. (4th) 514, at para. 33). Being the subject of defamatory counter-speech is not the price that those who engage in public debate by expressing minority views on contentious topics must inevitably pay. This is not what is envisioned by s. 4 of the PPPA, which, like s. 137.1 of the CJA, aims to ensure “that a plaintiff with a legitimate claim is not unduly deprived of the opportunity to vindicate that claim” (Pointes, at para. 48). In 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) have suffered serious harm of their day in court could very well be detrimental to public