03/02/2020 Slater v Blomfield [2014] NZHC 2221; [2014] 3 NZLR 835 (12 September 2014) to Mr Blomfield’s challenge. 56 Police v Campbell, above n 19, at [72]–[74] and [95]. [115] Moreover, it is in the public interest that court processes to work fairly. The identity of sources may in some cases not assist in relation to assessing whether the statements were true, but in others in assessing the truth of the allegations the identity of the sources may be relevant. Here, a source, such as Mr Spring, had a direct business involvement with Mr Blomfield. It is alleged by Mr Blomfield in his s 39 notice that Mr Spring and other alleged sources were part of a plan to make perjorative comments about Mr Blomfield. The role of those persons as a source, deliberately planning to hurt Mr Blomfield, could be relevant to their credibility, and thus to the defence of truth. Disclosure of the source is required for the fair working of the court process. [116] Disclosure of the sources may well assist in relation to the defence of honest opinion. The defence of honest opinion is now in s 10 of the Defamation Act 1992. Section 10(1) provides that the defence will fail unless the defendant proves that the opinion expressed was the defendant’s genuine opinion. Further, s 10(2) provides that where the defendant was not the author of the matter containing the opinion, the defence will fail unless the defendant was the author of the matter containing the opinion. The test is the honesty of the opinion, not its reasonableness.57 The test is now different from that previously at common law. The concepts of malice and corrupt motive no longer arise.58 The opinion must be based on facts which are true or not materially different from the truth.59 [117] Therefore to sustain this defence Mr Slater will need to demonstrate that he genuinely held the views that he expressed. In this regard, the identity of those who provided information to Mr Slater may be relevant. While malice is irrelevant, if a source is known to be angry and biased, it may be less likely that the journalist had a genuine (that is honest) opinion about a vilifying statement. Conversely, if the information originated from an apparently reliable source, that fact could make it more likely that the opinion subsequently based on that source was genuine. In Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Alex Harvey Industries Ltd it was held in relation to the newspaper rule to be well settled that where the defendant in 57 58 Mitchell v Sprott [2001] NZCA 343; [2002] NZLR 766 (CA) at [24]. Defamation Act 1992, s 10(3). 59 Defamation Act 1992, s 11(a); Mitchell v Sprott, above n 57, at [22]; Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television New Zealand Ltd [2008] NZCA 350 at [117]. defamation proceedings pleads fair comment or privilege and the plaintiff raises express malice in answer to the pleas, the identity of the informant is relevant and material to the plaintiff’s case.60 Fair comment is now honest opinion, and express malice has ceased to be an answer, but the concept that the identity of the informant could have been relevant to malice applies equally in my view to the new defence of honest opinion, when there is a challenge of this type. The identity of the informant can be relevant to whether the opinion is genuine. [118] The pleaded expressions of opinion of Mr Slater are extreme. He accuses Mr Blomfield amongst other things of the exploitation of trust involving children, and of being involved in wrongly changing the amounts shown as donations. It is said that he ripped off a charity, that he is a psychopath and that he loves extortion, www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/2221.html 25/30