108 seek to exercise its discretion and explore business practices prohibited by the rules. Ord v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 1136, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Alamo has thus adequately manifested its “intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by [regulation].” Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2342 (internal quotation marks omitted). Its inability to follow through on that intention constitutes an injury in fact for purposes of preenforcement review of the rules. That conclusion is fortified by the “strong presumption of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act” and the understanding that “the courts’ willingness to permit preenforcement review is at its peak when claims are rooted in the First Amendment.” New York Republican State Committee v. SEC, 799 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order “to avoid the chilling effects that come from unnecessarily expansive proscriptions on speech,” “courts have shown special solicitude” to such claims. Id. at 1135–36. Because Alamo’s standing enables us to consider the First Amendment arguments with respect to all three brightline rules, we have no need to consider Berninger’s standing. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006). B. Alamo argues that the open internet rules violate the First Amendment by forcing broadband providers to transmit speech with which they might disagree. We are unpersuaded. We have concluded that the Commission’s reclassification of broadband service as common carriage is a permissible exercise of its Title II authority, and Alamo does not challenge that determination. Common carriers have long