Page: 9 (Only to the extent that the employee chooses to use the City’s email. The employee is not required to provide the document itself to the City and can delete it from the electronic server at any time.) (6) Does the content of the record relate to the institution’s mandate and functions? (No. The emails have no bearing whatsoever on the processes of City government and cannot provide any information to citizens about the functioning of municipal government) (7) Does the institution have the authority to regulate the record’s use? (The City has authority to regulate the use of its email server and the nature of the emails sent by employees using that server. However, the City has no authority to regulate the use of the document itself.) (8) To what extent has the record been relied upon by the institution? (Not at all. There is nothing about the documents that can provide any glimpse into how the City operates.) (9) How closely has the record been integrated with the other records held by the institution? (The emails are stored in a separate file folder on the City’s email server and would not be accessible to other City personnel, except as required by the City to monitor for maintenance and security purposes or to determine whether employees are complying with guidelines for proper email and internet use.) (10) Does the institution have the authority to dispose of the record? (Only in the sense that it has ultimate control over the server upon which the record is stored) [31] Thus, in my opinion, an examination of these factors from the perspective of scrutinizing government action and making government documents available to citizens so that they can participate more fully in democracy, points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the documents cannot be said to be within the control of the City. The Arbitrator did not err in considering these factors to be relevant to her determination of what constitutes custody or control. She did err, however, in failing to consider those factors contextually in light of the purpose of the legislation. [32] The respondents argue that the broadest possible interpretation must be given to the qualifying language for the application of the Act and that any concerns about the personal nature of the material or privacy concerns should be left to be considered under the exemption sections of the legislation. I disagree. The Act itself13 and case authority interpreting it emphasize the necessity of construing exemptions narrowly in order to promote the intention of the legislation. Such an 13 Section 1 (b) of MFIPPA