ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION In some cases, disclosure may benefit as well as harm that aim. 3. Harm outweighs public interest benefit in disclosure The third part of the test requires the public body to consider whether, even if disclosure of information causes serious harm to a protected interest, there is nevertheless a wider public interest in disclosure. For instance, in relation to national security, disclosure of information exposing instances of bribery may concurrently undermine defence interests and expose corrupt buying practices. The latter, however, may lead to eradicating corruption and therefore strengthen national security in the long-term. In such cases, information should be disclosed notwithstanding that it may cause harm in the short term. Cumulatively, the three-part test is designed to guarantee that information is only withheld when it is in the overall public interest. If applied properly, this test would rule out all blanket exclusions and class exceptions as well as any provisions whose real aim is to protect the government from harassment, to prevent the exposure of wrongdoing, to avoid the concealment information from the public or to preclude entrenching a particular ideology. 2.2.2 Guidance on restrictions to freedom of expression and information – national security Finally, a specific set of minimum principles related to restrictions on national security grounds has also been set out in the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (“Johannesburg Principles”), adopted in October 1995 by a group of experts in international law and human rights convened by ARTICLE 19 and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand. The Johannesburg Principles have since been endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression and are used as a reference tool by the UN Commission on Human Rights.28 They recognise that the right to seek, receive and impart information may, at times, be restricted on specific grounds, including the protection of national security. However, national security cannot be a catch-all for limiting access to information. The following principles are of particular relevance: Principle 2: Legitimate National Security Interest (a) A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a country's existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether from an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent overthrow of the government. (b) In particular, a restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate if its genuine purpose or demonstrable effect is to protect interests unrelated to national security, including, for example, to protect a government from embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or to conceal information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to entrench a particular ideology, or to suppress industrial unrest. Principle 6: Expression That May Threaten National Security 28 See UN Doc. Nos. E/CN.4/RES/2003/42, E/CN.4/RES/2002/48, /CN.4/RES/2001/47, E/CN.4/RES/2000/38, E/CN.4/RES/1999/36, E/CN.4/RES/1998/42, E/CN.4/RES/1997/27 and E/CN.4/RES/1996/53. For example, in his 2003 and 2004 reports to the UN Commission on Human Rights: UN Doc. Nos. E/CN.4/2004/62 and E/CN.4/2003/67. Memorandum on Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. (50) for the Year 1971ARTICLE 19, London, 2005 – Index Number: LAW/2005/1205 -7-