Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. DPP v Bussetti proscribed by section 127(1)(a) was not explored before your Lordships and can be left for another day.)” 27. The ratio of Collins was conveniently summarised by Sweeney J in DPP v Kingsley Smith [2017] EWHC 359 (Admin) at paragraph 28. Sweeney J’s statement at paragraph 28(7) of the requisite mens rea was that “the Respondent intended his message be grossly offensive to those to whom it related; or that he was aware at the time of sending that it might be taken to be so by a reasonable member of the public who read or saw it”. This has not been disputed before us. 28. Mr Mark Summers QC for the Respondent referred us to two further cases. The defendant in Chambers v DPP [2013] 1 WLR 1833 was charged with sending a message of a menacing character contrary to section 127(1)(a) of the 2003 Act. He had been due to travel from an airport which was closed due to adverse weather conditions. He responded by posting several tweets on Twitter in his own name, including: “Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I am blowing the airport sky high!!” 29. None of his followers on Twitter who read the posting was alarmed by it at the time. Five days later the tweet came to the attention of the duty security manager at the airport. The manager did not consider the threat credible but reported it to the police. The defendant asserted that the tweet was a joke and not intended to be menacing. Mr Chambers was convicted by the magistrates’ court and his appeal to the Crown Court was dismissed. 30. On an appeal by way of case stated this court quashed the conviction. Lord Judge CJ held that:“30 … a message which cannot or is unlikely to be implemented may nevertheless create a sense of apprehension or fear in the person who receives or reads it. However unless it does so, it is difficult to see how it can sensibly be described as a message of a menacing character. So, if the person or persons who receive or read it, or may reasonably be expected to receive, or read it, would brush it aside as a silly joke, or a joke in bad taste, or empty bombastic or ridiculous banter, then it would be a contradiction in terms to describe it as a message of a menacing character. In short, a message which does not create fear or apprehension in those to whom it is communicated, or who may reasonably be expected to see it, falls outside this provision, for the very simple reason that the message lacks menace.” 31. At paragraph 38 Lord Judge added:“38. We agree with the submission by Mr Smith that the mental element of the offence is satisfied if the offender is proved to have intended that the message should be of a menacing character (the most serious form of the offence) or alternatively, if he is proved to have been aware of or to have recognised the