03/02/2020 FURST-PFEIFER v. AUSTRIA - 33677/10 (No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 : Respect for priva… 37. In particular, in cases concerning newspaper publications, the Court has previously held that the protection of private life has to be balanced, among other things, against the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (see, with further references, Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, no. 33846/07, § 56-58, 16 July 2013). 38. The Court has further found that, as a matter of principle, the rights guaranteed by these provisions deserve equal respect and the outcome of an application should not, in principle, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 10 of the Convention by the publisher of an offending article or under Article 8 of the Convention by the person who has been the subject of that article. Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in principle be the same in both (see Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 87, 7 February 2012, and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 106, ECHR-2012). 39. The Court has also observed that the most careful of scrutiny under Article 10 is required where measures or sanctions imposed on the press are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates on matters of legitimate public concern. Furthermore, particularly strong reasons must be provided for any measure limiting access to information which the public has the right to receive. The Court has also observed that the press must not overstep certain bounds, particularly as regards the reputation and rights of others (for many examples see Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski, cited above, § 56-58). 40. Where a balancing exercise between those two rights has been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts. In other words, there will usually be a wide margin afforded by the Court if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private interests or competing Convention rights (see, with further references, Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 139, 16 June 2015). 41. The Court reiterates that, in matters of freedom of expression, its task in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. The Court will look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” and whether they were “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, among many other authorities, Cojocaru v. Romania, no. 32104/06, § 21, 10 February 2015). 42. It follows that, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant claims a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court has to determine whether the principles inherent to Article 10 were properly applied by the Austrian courts when deciding the applicant’s actions (see for many, Ruusunen v. Finland, no. 73579/10, § 43, 14 January 2014; Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], no. 40454/07, § 93, 10 November 2015). 43. In previous case-law, the Court has emphasised that information about a person’s health is an important element of private life (see, S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 66, ECHR 2008). Both Courts of Appeal noted that the article concerned an important element of the applicant’s private life and compromised her in public but dismissed the compensation claims because the published facts were true and had a direct connection to the public sphere. However, the particular information on the applicant’s mental health stemmed from the report of a courtappointed expert acting in public proceedings before a civil court. Moreover, as can be seen from the persons quoted in the article at issue and their respective statements (see above paragraph 9), the authors of the article reported that the medical report had already provoked political reactions and thus participated in an ongoing public debate. 44. The Court notes that the article under consideration did not contain a reference to ongoing or recently ended court proceedings but a dispute if the applicant’s psychological condition as described by an expert report in 1993 would contravene her appointment as expert. As to the method of obtaining the information employed the Court observes that the applicant had never argued that the medical expert report at issue had been obtained illegally. As to the veracity of the information, the truth of the www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2016/431.html 8/23