Case 2:21-cv-00031-BJR Document 34 Filed 01/21/21 Page 10 of 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pierce Cty. Med. Bureau, Inc., 131 Wn. 2d 133, 157 (1997); Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 800 (1989). Exercising in good faith one’s legal interests is not improper interference. Leingang, 131 Wn. 2d at 157. Parler has failed to allege basic facts that would support several elements of this claim. Most fatally, as discussed above, it has failed to raise more than the scantest speculation that AWS’s actions were taken for an improper purpose or by improper means. Conversely, AWS has 7 denied it acted improperly, justifying its actions as a lawful exercise of rights it had pursuant to 8 9 either the suspension or the termination provisions of the CSA. Further, for the reasons outlined 10 supra, §§ III.B.(1) & (2), Parler has failed to demonstrate the likelihood that AWS breached the 11 CSA. To the contrary, the evidence at this point suggests that AWS’s termination of the CSA 12 was in response to Parler’s material breach. Parler has therefore not demonstrated a likelihood of 13 success on this claim. 14 C. Irreparable Injury 15 Because likelihood of success is a threshold inquiry, when “a plaintiff has failed to show 16 17 the likelihood of success on the merits, the Court “need not consider the remaining three Winter 18 elements.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015)(internal citation omitted). 19 Given the gravity of the issues presented, the Court nevertheless will do so. As noted above, a 20 plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm 21 22 in the absence of preliminary relief; importantly, a showing of a mere “possibility” of harm is not enough. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 22 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s “possibility” standard is too 23 24 25 lenient.”). Irreparable injury is traditionally defined as harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages. See Rent–A–Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.1991). 10