03/02/2020 UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSN., INC. meet Congress’ goals. Post, at 4 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting 201 F. Supp. 2d, at 410); post, at 4 (opinion of Souter, J.) (quoting 201 F. Supp. 2d, at 422—427). But we require the Government to employ the least restrictive means only when the forum is a public one and strict scrutiny applies. For the reasons stated above, see supra, at 8—10, such is not the case here. In deciding not to collect pornographic material from the Internet, a public library need not satisfy a court that it has pursued the least restrictive means of implementing that decision. In any case, the suggested alternatives have their own drawbacks. Close monitoring of computer users would be far more intrusive than the use of filtering software, and would risk transforming the role of a librarian from a professional to whom patrons turn for assistance into a compliance officer whom many patrons might wish to avoid. Moving terminals to places where their displays cannot easily be seen by other patrons, or installing privacy screens or recessed monitors, would not address a library’s interest in preventing patrons from deliberately using its computers to view online pornography. To the contrary, these alternatives would make it easier for patrons to do so. 4. The dissents argue that overblocking will “ ‘reduce the adult population … to reading only what is fit for children.’ ” Post, at 3, n. 2 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). See also post, at 3, and n. 2 (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002); United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000); and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997)); see post, at 7—8 (opinion of Souter, J.). But these cases are inapposite because they addressed Congress’ direct regulation of private conduct, not exercises of its Spending Power. The dissents also argue that because some library patrons would not make specific unblocking requests, the interest of authors of blocked Internet material “in reaching the widest possible audience would be abridged.” Post, at 6 (opinion of Stevens, J.); see post, at 13, n. 8 (opinion of Souter, J.). But this mistakes a public library’s purpose for acquiring Internet terminals: A library does so to provide its patrons with materials of requisite and appropriate quality, not to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves. See supra, at 9—10. Justice Stevens further argues that, because some libraries’ procedures will make it difficult for patrons to have blocked material unblocked, CIPA “will create a significant prior restraint on adult access to protected speech.” Post, at 6. But this argument, which the District Court did not address, mistakenly extends prior restraint doctrine to the context of public libraries’ collection decisions. A library’s decision to use filtering software is a collection decision, not a restraint on private speech. Contrary to Justice Stevens’ belief, a public library does not have an obligation to add material to its collection simply because the material is constitutionally protected. 5. See 20 U.S.C. § 9121 (“It is the purpose of [LSTA] (2) to stimulate excellence and promote access to learning and information resources in all types of libraries for individuals of all ages”); S. Conf. Rep. No. 104—230, p. 132 (1996) (The E-rate program “will help open new worlds of knowledge, learning and education to all https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-361.ZO.html 10/13