Case 5:17-cv-06064-LHK Document 54 Filed 03/26/18 Page 8 of 27
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including judgments and other public filed documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice. See,
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e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[Courts] may take notice of
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proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
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proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d
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Cir. 2000 (taking judicial notice of a filed complaint as a public record).
However, to the extent any facts in documents subject to judicial notice are subject to
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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reasonable dispute, the Court will not take judicial notice of those facts. See Lee v. City of L.A.,
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250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record . .
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. . But a court may not take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to reasonable dispute.” (internal
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quotation marks and citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa
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Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that both the complaint in the instant case and the class
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action complaint against Google are proper subjects of judicial notice because they are matters of
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public record. See Rothman, 220 F.3d at 92 (taking judicial notice of a filed complaint as a public
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record). However, because the facts alleged in both complaints are subject to reasonable dispute,
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the Court will not take judicial notice of the facts contained within those complaints. Moreover,
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the facts in the class action complaint against Google do not have a direct relation to the matters at
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issue in the instant case.
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III.
DISCUSSION
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As discussed above, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, and Plaintiff
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has moved for a preliminary injunction. The Court first discusses Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
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and then discusses Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
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A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
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In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed
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because (1) the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), bars all of Plaintiff’s
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causes of action except Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, Mot. at 8–13; (2) the First Amendment
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Case No. 17-CV-06064-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION;
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CAUSES OF ACTION; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION