revealed to a particular minority individually cannot be seen to exceed the bounds of punishment thereof, and the scope of punishment can be rather broadened. Even if the requirement such as the “possibility of direct recognition” is substituted with publicity by accepting the criticism in the Dissenting Opinion, such problems are still not ironed out. A substantial part of the criticism from the Dissenting Opinion merely derives from the fact that Article 307 of the Criminal Act basically stipulates defamation caused by alleging facts as the subject of punishment, and cannot be resolved simply by controlling the scope of the other party of such remarks. The Majority Opinion offers a perspective to provide substantial solutions by presenting the legal principle on limitation thereto in consideration of both sides of modalities and contents of an act of alleging facts by facing up to such reality and actively recognizing justifications stipulated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act. 1) According to the Dissenting Opinion, there seems to be a considerable structural difference from the Majority Opinion, but there is no particular difference when applied to cases in reality. To illustrate, in accordance with the Majority Opinion, a case of alleging facts to a small number of persons who have no close relationship with the person who made the remarks corresponds to a state that unspecified persons can directly recognize, and thus publicity will be acknowledged. The Majority Opinion also views that such case corresponds to those cases where there are circumstances to see that there is high possibility of propagation, and thus there is vast room to recognize publicity (eventually, no matter which view is followed, the conclusion is the same in that the criminality of criminal defamation is recognized). On the other hand, no matter which view is followed in the case of remarks to a particular minority who is personally in close relationships, publicity is denied, and thus the criminal defendant is highly likely to be found not guilty. Therefore, the scope of culpability cannot be seen to be limited only when following the Majority Opinion. Rather, according to the Majority Opinion, culpability scope can be substantially restricted as publicity is determined in consideration of objective overall circumstances at the time of an act such as the background leading up to the conversation, details of the facts alleged, how and where the facts were revealed, etc. as well as the relationship between the person uttering the remarks and the other party.