03/02/2020 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin) (27 July 2012) 18. The Crown Court went on to hold "that the required mens rea … is that the person sending the message must have intended the message to be menacing, or be aware that it might be taken to be so …" The court was satisfied that the appellant was, at the very least, aware that his message was of a menacing character. 19. The Crown Court posed the following very wide ranging issues for the decision of the High Court: "THE QUESTIONS FOR THE HIGH COURT (1) In order to prove that a message is "of a menacing character" within the meaning of Section 127(1)(a) (read according to conventional canons of construction or with the benefit of Article 10 ECHR and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998) is the prosecution required to prove, as part of the actus reus of the offence, that the person sending the message intended, "to create a fear in or through the recipient" (per Sedley LJ in Collins supra) or, were we correct to conclude that the question whether a message if "of a menacing character" is an objective question of fact for the Court to determine? 1(a) In order to prove that a message is of a "menacing character" within the meaning of Section 127(1)(a) (read according to conventional canons of construction or with the benefit of Article 10 ECHR and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998), is the Prosecution required to prove that the person sending the message intended to create a fear in or through the recipient (Sedley L.J., in Collins supra, having defined a menacing message as "a message that conveys a threat … which seeks to create a fear in or through the recipient that something unpleasant is likely to happen") or were we correct to conclude that the question of whether a message is "of a menacing character" is an objective question of fact for the Court to determine applying the standards of an open and just society and taking account of the words, context and all relevant circumstances? 1(b) Is the actus reus of the offence (Lord Bingham in Collins supra), 'the sending of a message of the proscribed character by the defined means', as we found, or does the actus reus include a requirement that the person sending the message intended the message to 'create a fear in or through the recipient'? (2) What is the mens rea for an offence of sending a message of menacing character contrary to Section 127(1)(a)? In particular: (a) Is Section 127(1)(a) (read according to convention canons of construction or with the benefit of Article 10 ECHR and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998) a crime of specific intent? (b) Is the Prosecution required to prove as part of the mens rea of the offence that the person sending the message intended to put another person in fear? (c) If the answer to (b) is no, is it sufficient for the Prosecution to prove that the person sending the message realised that his message may or might be taken as menacing, or must the prosecution prove that he realised that it would be taken as menacing by a person of reasonable firmness aware of all the relevant circumstances? (3) Did the Court act lawfully (within the meaning of Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998) in convicting and sentencing the Appellant as it did? In particular: (a) Did the Appellant's act in posting the message engage his right to freedom of expression under Article 10(1) ECHR? (b) If so, did his conviction and sentence amount to an 'interference' with the exercise of that right? www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2012/2157.html 5/10