Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. R (Bridges) -v- CC South Wales & ors 135. First, he submits that the “benefit” side of the proportionality balance needs to take into account not only the actual results of an operation when AFR Locate is deployed but its anticipated benefits. Although that may well be right as a matter of principle, it seems to us that that is a point in favour of SWP rather than the Appellant. In any event, it does not seem to us that the Divisional Court fell into error in its approach in this way. 136. Secondly, Mr Squires submits that the Divisional Court erred when examining the “cost” side of the proportionality balance by taking into account only the impact of the AFR deployment on this particular Appellant. He submits that, as a matter of common sense, account needs to be taken of the interference with the Article 8 rights not only of this particular Appellant but all other members of the public who would have been at the two venues in question when AFR Locate was deployed on 21 December 2017 and 27 March 2018. 137. In support of that submission Mr Squires cited several dicta from the Supreme Court. In particular, he referred to R (Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] UKSC 57, [2015] 1 WLR 3820, at [33], [39] and [41] in the judgment of Lady Hale DPSC. For example, at [39], Lady Hale referred to “the impact on the appellant and others in her position” (emphasis added). Conversely, earlier in the same paragraph, as Mr Beer pointed out to us, she referred to “the fair balance to be struck between the effect on the person whose rights have been infringed and the interests of the community” (emphasis added). 138. Mr Squires also cited the Christian Institute case, at para. 90, where the Court set out the familiar criteria for assessing proportionality and, under the fourth question, summarised it as being: “Whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure would contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter (i.e. whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned measure).” (Emphasis added) 139. It seems to us that the answer to a human rights question cannot depend on semantics, for example the use of the singular or the plural used by a judge in one passage in a judgment rather than in another passage. The issue has to be addressed as a matter of legal principle. 140. It may well be that in cases such as Tigere, where what is under challenge is a general measure, for example a policy or even a piece of legislation, it is appropriate for the Court to assess the balance between the impact on every person who is affected by the measure and the interests of the community. The present challenge, however, was not to such a general measure. The challenge was to a very specific deployment of AFR Locate on two particular occasions and the argument made in the Statement of Facts and Grounds was simply that this Appellant’s Article 8 rights had been violated. 141. It is significant that, in the Statement of Facts and Grounds, at para. 2, the complaint brought by the Appellant was formulated in the following way: