-31K.1 77. The knowledge criterion That the knowledge criterion identifies a distinguishing characteristic of a first or main publisher is clear from the doctrine of innocent dissemination itself: the absence of knowledge is the first requirement of that defence, being a defence only open to subordinate publishers. Thus, in Emmens v Pottle,62 Lord Esher MR stated : “The question is whether, as such disseminators, they published the libel? If they had known what was in the paper, whether they were paid for circulating it or not, they would have published the libel, and would have been liable for so doing. That, I think, cannot be doubted.” 78. And as laid down by Romer LJ in Vizetelly, to avail himself of the defence, the defendant must establish “... that he was innocent of any knowledge of the libel contained in the work disseminated by him.”63 79. The knowledge criterion is also reflected in the traditional inclusion of printers as within the class of first or main publishers – and in the more recent tendency to question whether such treatment of printers ought to be maintained. 80. Thus, in Thompson v Australian Capital TV Ltd, 64 the Australian High Court expressed itself in favour extending the innocent dissemination defence to printers on the basis that their knowledge of content can no longer be assumed or expected. In their joint judgment, 65 Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ stated: “...in both Emmens v Pottle and Vizetelly printers were regarded as outside the ambit of the defence of innocent dissemination. The printing technology of the time made it inevitable that the printer would know the contents of what was being printed. With changes in technology, the logic of treating printers in the same way as distributors 62 (1886) 16 QBD 354 at 357. 63 Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select Library [1900] 2 QB 170 at 180. 64 Thompson v Australian Capital TV Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574. 65 At 586-587.