In the impugned provisions, the safeguards can be inferred from the ordinary catch words to wit, "a police officer may, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offence under this Act, apply, ex parte, to the Court"; "A police officer may make an application under subsection (1) only with the prior written consent of the Attorney General"; "A Court to whom an application is made under subsection (1), may make an order...";"if the Court is satisfied that the written consent of the Attorney General has been obtained as required by subsection (2) and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that material information relating..."; and"... and certified by a Court..." It is thus certain to us that, in determining the ex-parte applications, the impugned provisions carter for unfettered judicial independence and impartiality. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence from the petitioner on how the judicial independence and impartiality is compromised by sections 31(l)-(4) and 34(4) of POTA, we are satisfied thus holding that the impugned provisions do not contravene article 13(3)&(6)(a) of the Constitution, rather; are a manifestation of how the principles of illegality, judicial independence and impartiality and other guidelines referred to earlier are observed. We are respectfully inclined to Mr Nyakiha's submission and his prayer that to sections 31(l)-(4) and 34(4) should be read in unison. Turning to section 42(1) & (2) of POTA which is alleged to violate the rights to-property, protection of one's property and fair hearing under articles 24(1) & (2) and 13(6)(a) of the Constitution, we regrettably noted that, during hearing the alleged violations were generalized without proof. Page 31 of 37