¶ 24 ¶ 25 ¶ 26 Standards Applicable to Rule 224 in Defamation Actions Rule 224(a)(1) provides: “(a) Procedure. (1) Petition. (i) A person *** who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in damages may file an independent action for such discovery. (ii) The action for discovery shall be initiated by the filing of a verified petition in the circuit court of the county in which the action or proceeding might be brought or in which one or more of the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought resides. The petition shall be brought in the name of the petitioner and shall name as respondents the persons or entities from whom discovery is sought and shall set forth: (A) the reason the proposed discovery is necessary and (B) the nature of the discovery sought and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to obtain such discovery. The order allowing the petition will limit discovery to the identification of responsible persons and entities and where a deposition is sought will specify the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, or, if unknown, information sufficient to identify each person and the time and place of the deposition.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 224(a)(1) (eff. May 30, 2008). Rule 224 is designed as a tool to assist a plaintiff in discovering the identity of an unidentified individual who may be liable to him. Ill. S. Ct. R. 224, Committee Comments (Aug. 1, 1989). At issue here is the rule’s requirement that the petitioner must demonstrate that discovery of the individual’s identity is “necessary.” The appellate court below, following Stone and Maxon, found that to demonstrate necessity, a petitioner must present sufficient allegations of a defamation claim to overcome a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. 2014 IL App (2d) 130489, ¶ 15. See Stone, 2011 IL App (1st) 093386, ¶ 18; Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 712. “[I]n ordering the disclosure of a potential defendant’s identity pursuant to Rule 224, a court must balance the potential plaintiff’s right to redress for unprotected defamatory language against the danger of setting a standard for disclosure that is so low that it effectively chills or eliminates the right to speak anonymously and fails to adequately protect the chosen anonymity of those engaging in nondefamatory public discourse.” 2014 IL App (2d) 130489, ¶ 17. The Maxon court concluded the section 2-615 standard was proper since “subjecting a Rule 224 petition to the same level of scrutiny afforded the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to section 2-615 will address any constitutional concerns arising from disclosing the identity of any potential defendant,” i.e., a plaintiff must plead facts to establish the alleged defamatory statements are not constitutionally protected. Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 712. That court further found that a more stringent standard was not required, such as those courts employing the Dendrite-Cahill summary judgment standard (Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005)), since once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for defamation to satisfy section 2-615, a potential defendant has no first amendment right to balance against the plaintiff’s right to redress because there is no first amendment right to defame. Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 714. Moreover, Illinois is a fact pleading state and, therefore, if a complaint can survive a motion to dismiss, it -6-