¶ 34 ¶ 35 ¶ 36 ¶ 37 “[T]here is no artificial distinction between opinion and fact: a false assertion of fact can be defamatory even when couched within apparent opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. [Citations.] Indeed, ‘[i]t is well established that statements made in the form of insinuation, allusion, irony, or question, may be considered as defamatory as positive and direct assertions of fact.’ [Citation.] Similarly, ‘[a] defendant cannot escape liability for defamatory factual assertions simply by claiming that the statements were a form of ridicule, humor or sarcasm.’ [Citation.] The test is restrictive: a defamatory statement is constitutionally protected only if it cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual fact. [Citation.] Several considerations aid our analysis: whether the statement has a precise and readily understood meaning; whether the statement is verifiable; and whether the statement’s literary or social context signals that it has factual content. [Citations.] If a statement is factual, and it is false, it is actionable.” Id. at 581. Fuboy contends that Hadley’s complaint does not sufficiently allege a defamation claim to withstand a motion to dismiss under section 2-615. Fuboy maintains that it is not a crime to have the last name Sandusky. According to Fuboy, Hadley’s complaint is therefore deficient as a matter of law since he is unable to show that a reader would discern a defamatory meaning from the statement without the benefit of extrinsic facts. In other words, in Fuboy’s view, the statement did not have a particular meaning sufficient to find it defamatory per se. Hadley contends his complaint adequately set forth a defamation claim to withstand a motion to dismiss under section 2-615. Hadley asserts that the statement need only infer the commission of a crime. And, considered in context with the timing of national events and circumstances, Hadley maintains it is clear that Fuboy conveyed that Hadley was a child molester living adjacent to a grade school. Like the appellate court, we agree with Hadley that Fuboy’s statement imputes the commission of a crime to Hadley. The appellate court took judicial notice of the fact that, at the time Fuboy’s comment was posted, “the Sandusky sexual abuse scandal had dominated the national news for weeks. Sandusky was a football coach for the famed Penn State football program. Over the course of years, Sandusky allegedly sexually abused young boys. The degree to which Sandusky’s coaching colleagues knew of and failed to alert the appropriate authorities of Sandusky’s criminal activities became part of the scandal.” 2014 IL App (2d) 130489, ¶ 27. In short, at the time of Fuboy’s comment, numerous men were testifying to the abuse they allegedly suffered at the hands of Sandusky when they were young boys. The general public was mindful of the fact Sandusky was accused of sexually abusing young boys. Stating that Hadley was “a Sandusky” while the scandal dominated the national news, coupled with the reference to Empire Elementary School, conveyed the idea that Hadley was a pedophile or had engaged in sexual acts with children and, thus, had committed criminal conduct. As the appellate court stated, “[t]o ignore the reference to a national story of this magnitude would be to ‘espouse a naïveté unwarranted under the circumstances.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)” Id. While Fuboy did not explicitly state Hadley was a pedophile, as we concluded in Tuite, this is not fatal. Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 514. Giving the words used by Fuboy their natural and obvious meaning, and considering the timing of the comment, we find the idea Fuboy intended to convey to the reasonable reader by his statement, “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to -8-