12 ELONIS v. UNITED STATES THOMAS, J., dissenting II In light of my conclusion that Elonis was properly con­ victed under the requirements of §875(c), I must address his argument that his threatening posts were nevertheless protected by the First Amendment. A Elonis does not contend that threats are constitutionally protected speech, nor could he: “From 1791 to the present, . . . our society . . . has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” true threats being one of them. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382– 383 (1992); see id., at 388. Instead, Elonis claims that only intentional threats fall within this particular histori­ cal exception. If it were clear that intentional threats alone have been punished in our Nation since 1791, I would be inclined to agree. But that is the not the case. Although the Federal Government apparently did not get into the business of regulating threats until 1917, the States have been doing so since the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See, e.g., 1795 N. J. Laws p. 108; Ill. Rev. Code of Laws, Crim. Code §108 (1827) (1827 Ill. Crim. Code); 1832 Fla. Laws pp. 68– 69. And that practice continued even after the States amended their constitutions to include speech protections similar to those in the First Amendment. See, e.g., Fla. Const., Art. I, §5 (1838); Ill. Const., Art. VIII, §22 (1818), Mich. Const., Art. I, §7 (1835); N. J. Const., Art. I, §5 (1844); J. Hood, Index of Colonial and State Laws of New Jersey 1203, 1235, 1257, 1265 (1905); 1 Ill. Stat., ch. 30, div. 9, §31 (3d ed. 1873). State practice thus provides at least some evidence of the original meaning of the phrase “freedom of speech” in the First Amendment. See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 481–483 (1957) (engaging in a similar inquiry with respect to obscenity). Shortly after the founding, several States and Territo­