Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 19 THOMAS, J., dissenting liability in tort for false statements about private persons on matters of private concern even if the speaker acted negligently with respect to the falsity of those statements. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767, 770, 773–775 (1986). I see no reason why we should give threats pride of place among unprotected speech. * * * There is always a risk that a criminal threat statute may be deployed by the Government to suppress legiti­ mate speech. But the proper response to that risk is to adhere to our traditional rule that only a narrow class of true threats, historically unprotected, may be constitu­ tionally proscribed. The solution is not to abandon a mental-state require­ ment compelled by text, history, and precedent. Not only does such a decision warp our traditional approach to mens rea, it results in an arbitrary distinction between threats and other forms of unprotected speech. Had Elo­ nis mailed obscene materials to his wife and a kindergar­ ten class, he could have been prosecuted irrespective of whether he intended to offend those recipients or reck­ lessly disregarded that possibility. Yet when he threat­ ened to kill his wife and a kindergarten class, his intent to terrify those recipients (or reckless disregard of that risk) suddenly becomes highly relevant. That need not—and should not—be the case. Nor should it be the case that we cast aside the mentalstate requirement compelled by our precedents yet offer nothing in its place. Our job is to decide questions, not create them. Given the majority’s ostensible concern for protecting innocent actors, one would have expected it to announce a clear rule—any clear rule. Its failure to do so reveals the fractured foundation upon which today’s deci­ sion rests. I respectfully dissent.