10 SMAJIĆ v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DECISION national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 30. The applicant argued that his intention had not been to incite national, racial and religious hatred, discord or intolerance, but to express his own opinion on a matter of public concern. He had only been reacting to frequent calls for secession by the highest political authorities in the Republika Srpska. 31. The Court notes that the applicant’s conviction amounted to an “interference” with his right to freedom of expression. An interference contravenes Article 10 of the Convention unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 10, and is “necessary in a democratic society” for achieving such an aim or aims. 32. The interference in the present case was prescribed by law; namely, it was based on Article 160 § 1 of the 2003 BD Criminal Code (see paragraph 13 above). Furthermore, the Court is satisfied that it pursued at least one of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 – namely the protection of the reputation and rights of others. 33. The Court reiterates that freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to Article 10 § 2, it applies not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without which there is no “democratic society”. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, but these must be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, § 196 (i), ECHR 2015 (extracts)). 34. The Court notes at the outset that it is not its task to rule on the constituent elements of the offence of which the applicant was convicted under domestic law by reviewing whether those elements actually arose from his actions (see, mutatis mutandis, Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), no. 35222/04, 20 February 2007, and Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), no. 34367/14, § 29, 27 June 2017). The Court’s task is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but to review the decisions that they made under Article 10. What the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the comments held against the applicant and the context in which he made them (see Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 89, ECHR 2004-XI).