covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.’ In the first place, the 1st respondent in this matter was not an Administrative Tribunal. Second, there is no evidence indicating that there are procedural are rules laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred which the 1st respondent failed to observe. Third, the word online content was not defined either in the parent Act or in the Regulations. However, I find that the 1st respondent acted ultra vires when, under rule 3 of the Regulations, he defined the word content to mean ‘sound, data, text or images whether still or moving’ which definition, as rightly argued by learned counsel for the applicants, is in conflict with the definition of the same word assigned by the Parliament in the parent Act. Under section 3 of the Electronic and Postal Communications Act the word ‘content’ is defined to mean ‘information in the form of speech or other sound, data, text or images whether still or moving, except where transmitted in private communications’. Here, the phrases ‘information in the form o f and ‘except where transmitted in private communications’ were omitted by the 1st respondent. This means that 1st respondent went beyond the scope of authority conferred on him. This illegality, does not, however, vitiate the whole Regulations.