with the enabling Act, it therefore renders almost all regulations null and void. Submitting in reply to ground No. 1, learned senior state attorney for the respondents argued that a subsidiary legislation is not a replica of the main Act and that as a general rule, subsidiary legislation provides clarity, elaboration and more explanation on how the parent Act should be realised and implemented. Mr. Ladislaus Komanya detailed the reasons why the legislation is delegated by the Parliament and insisted that the subsidiary legislation has the same effect as if they were passed in the Parliament. On the procedural impropriety, learned senior state attorney submitted, and rightly so, that it is the Statute which has to provide procedures and if no such procedure are provided, there cannot be procedural impropriety. It is true, as contended by learned senior state attorney that section 103 of EPOCA does not mandatorily require the Minister to consult the interested groups and that the same section does not set limits to the power of the Minister when making these Regulations. On the issue of the definition of the word “content” in the Regulations being different from the definition assigned in the parent Act, learned senior state attorney told this court that there is no difference. Essentially, it is being argued for the respondents that the 1st respondent, in promulgating the impugned Regulations acted intra vires.