SPECIAL COLLECTION OF THE CASE LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION the internet also plays a very important role in trade and commerce, and some businesses are completely dependent on the web. Therefore, the Court does not declare the right to access the internet as a fundamental right per se, although it is also considered to be directly connected to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. The Court also acknowledges that (similarly to international human rights standards) India’s Constitution allows the Government to restrict freedom of expression as long as the limitations are prescribed by law, are reasonable, and pursue a legitimate purpose. The Constitution enounces an exhaustive list of reasonable and legitimate causes for restrictions that include “interests of the sovereignty, integrity, security, friendly relations with the foreign States, public order, decency or morality or contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence” (article 19.2). Restrictions might even include, according to the case law of the Supreme Court, complete prohibitions in certain areas, although they should not excessively burden free speech and the relevant authority must properly justify before the Court that lesser alternatives would be inadequate. Based on this constitutional framework, the Court particularly focuses on the implications of the proportionality standards considering the following: a) Modern terrorists relied heavily on the internet, which allows them to disseminate false information and propaganda, raise funds, and recruit others to their cause. Therefore, the so-called “war on terror” may be seen as a legitimate cause to restrict freedom of expression in certain circumstances. b) The standard of proportionality is key to ensuring that a right is not restricted beyond what is necessary. In particular, when balancing national security with liberty, authorities should in any case be prohibited from achieving a public good at the cost of fundamental rights. To illustrate the importance of proportionality when assessing restrictions to fundamental rights, the Court presents an extensive comparative review of proportionality tests used by Indian, German and Canadian Courts. c) Therefore, the proportionality test encompasses a series of cumulative elements: the goal of the restriction must be legitimate, the restriction must be necessary, the authorities must consider if alternative measures to the restriction exist, the least restrictive measure must be taken, and the restriction must be open to judicial review. d) More precisely, according to the Court, “the degree of restriction and the scope of the same, both territorially and temporally, must stand in relation to what is actually necessary to combat an emergent situation (…). The concept of proportionality requires a restriction to be tailored in accordance with the territorial extent of the restriction, the stage of emergency, nature of urgency, duration of such restrictive measure and nature of such restriction.” Regarding the central issue of the legality of the restriction, the Court subsequently declares that to issue a suspension order, the Government first had to determine that a public emergency existed. This “public emergency” is required to be of a serious nature and needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In 33