While the decision does not provide background on the facts surrounding why Twitter suspended the user’s account, Eric Goldman writing for the Technology and Marketing Law Blog observed that the Court widens Section 230 of the CDA’s jurisprudence emerging from Riggs v. MySpace to Sikhs for Justice v. Facebook to Taylor v. Twitter, wherein the Court in each case treats the plaintiff’s content as the “third party” content for Section 230 purposes and holds that Section 230 protects the defendant’s decision to remove the plaintiff’s “third party” content. The Court in this decision reaffirmed the Communications Decency Act protection of interactive platforms from liability. However, by focusing on the contractual relationship between the plaintiff and Twitter, the Court failed to address the possible impact of removing the content for the user in light of the national and international standards of freedom of expression, allowing interactive platforms to over-moderate by censoring content.

This case did not set a binding or persuasive precedent either within or outside its jurisdiction. The significance of this case is undetermined at this point in time.