to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression. Moreover, the the defendant’s expression and the harm suffered. Where the defendant is not the only one speaking out against the plaintiff, inferring a causal link between the defendant’s expression and the harm suffered by the plaintiff becomes both more important and more difficult. In the instant case, given the dearth of evidence from N on harm, the chambers judge did not err in concluding that N had adduced almost no evidence of damage suffered as a result of H’s statements. The harm relevant to the public interest weighing exercise is harm to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s statements, not by the plaintiff’s inability to sue. The loss of a right to sue is a possible outcome of the public interest weighing exercise, not an input. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal’s consideration of a chilling effect flowing from a plaintiff’s inability to pursue a defamation claim turns the concept on its head. The Court’s freedom of expression jurisprudence addresses the concern that the possible imposition of a legal penalty would cause speakers to refrain from commenting on matters of public interest. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the inability to inflict a legal penalty on H would chill N’s expression and those of others who wish to express unpopular views. There is no chilling effect in barring potential plaintiffs from silencing their critics and collecting damages through a defamation suit. The other side of the weighing exercise evaluates the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression. In making this assessment, s. 2(b) Charter 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) legislation requires some evidence that enables the judge to infer a causal link between