to their obligations is generally understood to be a critique, not a declaration of fact. in the context of this case. [113] Additionally, Mr. Neufeld contends that because the Criminal Code recognizes an offence of wilful promotion of hatred (see s. 319(2)), the allegation that he “tip toed . . . into hate speech” would be taken as imputing criminal liability. I do not agree that accusations of hate speech would necessarily be understood by ordinary readers as referring to a Criminal Code offence. Such allegations have permeated public discourse in a way that well exceeds their narrow meaning within the legal system. In any event, the reference to hate speech was published within an ongoing public debate in an editorial in which Mr. Hansman was being asked to comment on the human rights complaint he had recently filed. It is clear, when read in context, that the statement expressed Mr. Hansman’s belief that Mr. Neufeld had “tip toed . . . into hate speech”, based on his own interpretation of Mr. Neufeld’s statements. An assertion that might be taken as factual in one context may be properly construed as comment in another (WIC Radio, at para. 26; see Awan, at para. 76 (calling someone a “liar” can be fact or comment, depending on the context)). [114] Considered as a whole, the chambers judge was entitled to find under s. 4(2)(a)(ii) that the “sting” of Mr. Hansman’s statements was “comment and it would have been understood as such” by readers (WIC Radio, at para. 27). (c) Was the Fair Comment Defence Defeated by Malice? 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) Mr. Neufeld has not shown grounds to believe that it would not be seen as a comment