opportunity to vindicate that claim” (Pointes, at para. 48 (emphasis added); see also merits-based hurdle stage, which concerns “the strength of the underlying proceeding” (para. 60). In my view, by concluding that the order of the analysis is irrelevant and merely a matter of judicial discretion, my colleague undermines that legislative objective. [138] The analysis of the merits-based hurdle informs that of the public interest hurdle. One aspect of the public interest hurdle requires assessing the seriousness of the harm suffered by the respondent (the plaintiff in the underlying proceeding) as a result of the applicant’s expression, a task that is difficult if not impossible to perform without looking at the strength of the underlying proceeding. The following example illustrates this point. In a defamation action, harm is presumed (Pointes, at para. 71), but whether a claim has a real prospect of meeting the test for defamation must be determined at the merits-based hurdle stage (Bent, at paras. 91 et seq.). [139] My colleague’s approach does one of two things: either it glosses over the harm analysis or it subsumes the merits-based hurdle under the public interest hurdle. Neither of these options is desirable. Indeed, the first tips the scales in favour of the applicant and upsets the balance that must be carefully maintained between freedom of expression and the protection of individual reputation. The latter effectively rewrites s. 137.1(4) of the CJA and s. 4 of the PPPA, which our Court is obviously not entitled to do. 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) paras. 63-64). The legitimacy of a claim is assessed, first and foremost, at the