MURPHY v. IRELAND JUDGMENT 3 mainly, that if the IRTC had correctly applied section 10(3) of the 1988 Act, that provision was unconstitutional. 11. By judgment delivered on 25 April 1997, the High Court found that the IRTC had not infringed section 10(3) of the 1988 Act. It further considered that the unspecified right to communicate guaranteed by Article 40(3)(1) of the Constitution was at issue since the advertisement had, as its principal purpose, the communication of information. However, it found that section 10(3) was a reasonable limitation on the right to communicate and that there were good reasons in the public interest for the ban. 12. In so concluding the High Court judge stated as follows: “I think that it would have been reasonable for [Parliament] to take the view that in Irish society religious advertising on commercial radio might be undesirable in the public interest. ... It is sufficient, in my view, if there were good reasons in the public interest for the ban. Irish people with religious beliefs tend to belong to particular churches and that being so religious advertising coming from a different church can be offensive to many people and might be open to the interpretation of proselytising. Religion has been a divisive factor in Northern Ireland and this is something which [Parliament] may well have taken into account. ... a person listening to commercial radio is for all practical purposes compelled to listen to the advertisements. That being so, it is legitimate for any [Parliament] to have regard to the type of advertisements which might be permitted. The impugned Section enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. It is not obvious to me that a restriction on religious advertising is not a reasonable restriction in the interest of the common good on this particular form of exercise of the right to communicate. Of course it has been suggested on behalf of the Applicant that a blanket restriction is not proportional and that even if some restriction would be reasonable it would have to be less draconian. The absolute restriction according to the argument of Counsel for the Applicant infringes the doctrine of proportionality. I cannot accept this view. On the legislation as it stands there are very few limitations on the right to advertise and in that sense proportionality has already been taken into account. But at any rate, I do not think that one could subdivide religious advertising. Once a reasonable view can be put forward that religious advertising might be undesirable in the public interest, it would be impossible in practice to devise a wording that might have the effect of permitting certain alleged categories of innocuous religious advertising. It is the fact that the advertisement is directed towards a religious end and not some particular aspect of a religious end which might be potentially offensive to the public.” 13. The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal by judgment dated 28 May 1998. The judgment began by noting that: “One can best glean the policy of the Act of 1988 by looking at the three kinds of prohibited advertisement collectively. One might get a false impression by singling out one kind of banned advertisement and ignoring the others. All three kinds of banned advertisement relate to matters which have proved extremely divisive in Irish society in the past. [Parliament] was entitled to take the view that the citizens would resent having advertisements touching on these topics broadcast into their homes and that such advertisements, if permitted, might lead to unrest. Moreover, [Parliament] may well have thought that in relation to matters of such sensitivity, rich men should not be able to buy access to the airwaves to the detriment of their poorer rivals.”