MADLANGA J know from sections 1 and 9A of PAJA, considered with the principles underlying implied powers, that a definition section can confer a power. In sum, I conclude that section 1 of RICA, read with the provisions on the functions of a designated Judge, does provide for the power to designate a Judge. [80] I am yet to deal with the independence challenge. One may ask: what is the point of “saving” RICA insofar as the question of the power to designate is concerned, if we may still invalidate it based on the independence challenge? These are two distinct aspects that must be dealt with separately. It would be illogical to say there is no power because, in any event, the power-conferring provision is unconstitutional for inconsistency with the Bill of Rights. There is an antecedent question. That is, is there a power? If there is, there is a second question: is the power constitutional? I now proceed to deal with the independence challenge. [81] In their pleaded case the applicants contend that the definition of “designated Judge” which – as I have now held – is the power-conferring provision does not provide adequate safeguards for the structural and perceived independence of the designated Judge. The independence challenge is founded on the grounds that: RICA fails to prescribe or limit the designated Judge’s term of office, making it possible for the Minister to make indefinite reappointments; each term is for a duration determined at the whim of the Minister; and appointments of designated Judges are exclusively made by a member of the Executive in a non-transparent manner in that there is no role for the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), Parliament or the Chief Justice. The Minister of State Security argues that the Constitution is silent on the appointment of Judges to perform the functions contemplated in RICA. She stresses that the designated Judge is appointed from the ranks of Judges who are presumed independent, and that the Constitution does not require extra measures to guarantee their independence. [82] That search and seizure warrants – which by their nature result in the violation of privacy – must be issued by an independent Judiciary is a leitmotif across our constitutional jurisprudence. In Thint this Court recognised “the fact that the decision 47