MADLANGA J an applicant for recusal of a Judge, which is based on the presumption that Judicial Officers are impartial.125 But it does not mean that Judges are infallible,126 nor does it mean there is no possibility that Judges may attempt to abuse their office.127 As Judges, we should not – because of our own belief in our independence – be sanctimoniously dismissive of the fact that we may be susceptible to these ills. Indeed, Nelson explains that “it would not be realistic” for Judges to “assume a sanctimonious or puritanical attitude”.128 [90] As such, structures, mechanisms and processes that strengthen the independence of an institution or office are imperative even where the incumbent is a Judge. Indeed, in Justice Alliance, this Court held that “[n]on-renewability [of the term] fosters public confidence in the institution of the Judiciary as a whole, since its members function with neither threat that their terms will not be renewed nor any inducement to seek to secure renewal”.129 The fact that it was the prestigious office of the Chief Justice130 that was at the heart of the enquiry in that matter did not render the scrutinisation of its structural temperament and commitment to constitutional values (Cowen “Judicial selection: What Qualities Do We Expect in a South African Judge?” in Bentley et al (eds) Falls the Shadow: Between the Promise and the Reality of the South African Constitution (UCT Press, Cape Town 2013) at 155). Upon assuming office, South African judges are required by section 174(8) of the Constitution to take an oath or affirm that they will uphold and protect the Constitution. 125 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union - Judgment on recusal application [1999] ZACC 9; 1999 (4) SA 147; 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC) at para 40; Stainbank v South African Apartheid Museum at Freedom Park [2011] ZACC 20; 2011 (10) BCLR 1058 (CC) at para 36. See also Freedman “The Impartiality of the Judiciary” in LAWSA 3rd ed vol 7(2) at 318. Bassett argues that “[a]lthough judges may believe themselves free of bias, the bias blind spot, like unconscious bias, is simply a human phenomenon, and therefore, again, one from which judges are not immune”. (Bassett “Three Reasons Why the Challenged Judge Should Not Rule on a Judicial Recusal Motion” (2015) 18 NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 659 at 671). 126 Judge Wallace states that “[j]udicial corruption certainly exists; I know of no country that is completely free of corruption, with its insidious effect of undermining the rule of law” and that “[j]udicial corruption not only knocks judges off [their] perceived pedestals, but also erodes respect for law”. (Wallace “Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial Independence: Comparative Perspectives” (1998) 28 California Western International Law Journal 341 at 341-2). 127 128 Nelson The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics and Ideology in New York: 1920-1980 (The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London 2001) at 222. 129 Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa [2011] ZACC 23; 2011 (5) SA 388 (CC); 2011 (10) BCLR 1017 (CC) at para 73. 130 Id at para 78, where this Court considered the importance of the role of the Chief Justice, and the distinctive appointment process therefor. 51