30 KABLIS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT duly approved, the applicant was disseminating information on a matter of public interest. 101. The Court reiterates in this connection that under its case-law, expression on matters of public interest is entitled to strong protection (see Perinçek, cited above, § 230). There is therefore little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on expression on matters of public interest (see Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-IV) and very strong reasons are required for justifying such restrictions (see Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 83, ECHR 2001‑VIII, and Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, no. 10877/04, § 47, 23 October 2008, with further references). The domestic authorities did not advance any reasons for blocking access to the two above-mentioned posts and did not explain why they had been included in the blocking measure, even though they did not contain any calls for participation in a public event held in breach of the established procedure. 102. As regards the third entry on the blog and the post on the social networking site, they contained explicit calls to participate in the public event which the local authorities had earlier refused to approve (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). The Court reiterates in this connection that it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful unlawful gatherings (see Kudrevičius and Others, cited above, § 150, and Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, § 143, 15 November 2018). 103. The Court further reiterates that it is normally not sufficient that the interference was imposed because its subject-matter fell within a particular category or was caught by a legal rule formulated in general or absolute terms; what is rather required is that it was necessary in the specific circumstances (see Perinçek, cited above, § 275, and The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 65 in fine, Series A no. 30). In the context of public assemblies, this means that the absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing “unlawfulness” of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11 (see Kudrevičius and Others, cited above, § 151). It follows that the fact that the applicant breached a statutory prohibition by calling for participation in a public event held in breach of the established procedure is not sufficient in itself to justify an interference with his freedom of expression. The Court must examine whether it was necessary in a democratic society to block the publications at issue, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 104. The Court observes, firstly, that the aim of the public event was to express an opinion on a topical issue of public interest, namely the recent arrest of the regional government officials (see paragraph 6 above). Secondly, the approval of the public event had been refused on formal grounds – because of a general ban on holding public events at the location