18 KABLIS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT situations regardless of the individual facts of each case, even if this might result in individual hard cases (see Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 106, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). However, a general ban on demonstrations can only be justified if there is a real danger of their resulting in disorder which cannot be prevented by other less stringent measures. In this connection, the authority must take into account the effect of a ban on demonstrations which do not by themselves constitute a danger to public order. Only if the disadvantage of such demonstrations being caught by the ban is clearly outweighed by the security considerations justifying the issue of the ban, and if there is no possibility of avoiding such undesirable side effects of the ban by a narrow circumscription of its scope in terms of territorial application and duration, can the ban be regarded as being necessary within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention (see Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom, no. 8440/78, Commission decision of 16 July 1980). 55. No arguments regarding risk of public disorder or security considerations have ever been advanced to justify the general ban on holding public events in Stefanovskaya Square. Indeed, the regional law establishing that ban simply paraphrased the Public Events Act – stating that the holding of public events there might result in disruptions in the functioning of public utilities, transport, social or communications services and the obstruction of pedestrians or traffic or the hindering of citizens’ access to residential buildings or transport and social services. It is significant that neither the regional law itself, nor any other legal provision or judicial interpretation explained which of the above circumstances were relevant to Stefanovskaya Square and why. In any event, the Court has already found that such reasons were not in themselves sufficient to justify a general ban on holding public events at a certain location (see paragraph 53 above). 56. Nor has any explanation been given as to why a general ban was a more feasible means of achieving the aim of preventing serious disruptions of people’s ordinary life than a provision allowing a case-by-case examination, taking account of the possibility of minimising such disruption, for example by organising a temporary diversion of traffic on alternative routes or by taking other similar measures, and at the same time accommodating the organisers’ legitimate interests in assembling at their chosen location. Furthermore, it was never argued that the general ban could not be relaxed without a risk of abuse, significant uncertainty, discrimination or arbitrariness. Lastly, the general ban is not limited in time and applies to all public events, irrespective of the number of participants and the event’s potential to cause disruptions of people’s ordinary life. The general ban at issue is therefore not specifically circumscribed to address a precise risk of serious disruption with a minimum impairment of the right to