51. First, although he gave an impressive and careful judgment, Jackson LJ misdirected himself in an important respect when reaching the decision to discharge the interlocutory injunction which had been previously granted. Having rightly said that it was necessary to balance PJS’s right to respect for his private and family life against NGN’s right to freedom of his expression, he said that section 12 of the Human Rights Act “enhances the weight” to be given to the latter factor. However, that is not right. As Lord Steyn made clear in In re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593, para 17, each right has equal potential force in principle, and the question is which way the balance falls in the light of the specific facts and considerations in a particular case. This was an error which entitles, indeed obliges, us to reconsider the question of discharging the interlocutory injunction. 52. Secondly, there is an argument that it was wrong to proceed on the basis that the story had what Jackson LJ described as “limited”, as opposed to no, “public interest”. Of course, there is always a public interest in anyone - particularly, some may think, the media - having the right to say what they want. As Jackson LJ rightly said in his first judgment in this case at para 55, “[freedom of expression is an important right for its own sake”; and that is recognised by section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which provides that “[t]he court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression”. However, following section 12(4)(a)(ii) of the 1998 Act, it appears to me that it was the public interest (as opposed to the interests of some members of the public) in the story being published which Jackson LJ was describing. In his earlier judgment in which he decided to grant the injunction, Jackson LJ decided that there was no public interest in the story being published (see [2016] EWCA Civ 100, para 53), and, as that finding has unsurprisingly not been appealed, it must be accepted, at least until trial. Having said that, I very much doubt that this factor would have been enough to persuade me that we could reconsider the question of continuing the interlocutory injunction, but, in the light of what I say in para 51 above and para 53 below, that is an academic point. 53. Thirdly, it appears to me that the Court of Appeal overlooked, or at any rate gave insufficient weight to, the intrusive and distressing effect on PJS and his family of newspaper coverage of the story, to some extent conflating that question with confidentiality. I will say more about that aspect in the next section of this judgment. The continuation of the interlocutory injunction 54. It is therefore for this Court to decide whether or not to re-impose the interlocutory injunction, it appears to me that the central issue in that connection is whether the trial judge would be likely to grant a permanent injunction when this case comes to trial. Section 12(3) of the 1998 Act precludes the grant of an interlocutory injunction unless a permanent injunction is “likely” to be granted at Page 28