Other Courts of Appeals have understood the Act in a similar manner. In In re: Zynga Privacy Litigation, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Act “covers access to electronic information stored in third party computers.”100 So, too, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Steiger, which held that “the [Stored Communications Act] clearly applies, for example, to information stored with a phone company, Internet Service Provider (ISP), or electronic bulletin board system,” but that the Act “does not appear to apply to the [government’s] source’s hacking into [the plaintiff’s personal] computer . . . because there is no evidence that [the] computer maintained any ‘electronic communication service[.]’”101 The plaintiffs point to various district court decisions that have accepted that personal computers can be protected “facilities” under the Stored Communications Act.102 However, as another district court observes, these decisions “provide little analysis on this point of law, instead 100 750 F.3d at 1104 (emphasis added). 101 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003). In Steiger, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “reading . . . the Wiretap Act to cover only real-time interception of electronic communications, together with the apparent non-applicability of the [Stored Communications] Act to hacking into personal computers to retrieve information stored therein, reveals a legislative hiatus in the current laws purporting to protect privacy in electronic communications.” Id. 102 E.g., Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2012) Expert Janitorial, LLC v. Williams, 2010 WL 908740, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2010); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 47