explained that “Section 631 was aimed at one aspect of the privacy problem—eavesdropping, or the secret monitoring of conversations by third parties.”136 The District Court dismissed the § 631(a) claim for the same reasons that it dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal wiretapping claim. As discussed above, the pleadings demonstrate that Google was itself a party to all the electronic transmissions that are the bases of the plaintiffs’ wiretapping claims.137 Because § 631 is aimed only at “eavesdropping, or the secret monitoring of conversations by third parties,”138 we will affirm the dismissal of the California Invasion of Privacy Act claim for the same reasons we affirm the dismissal of the federal Wiretap Act claim. 136 Ribas v. Clark, 696 P.2d 637, 640 (Cal. 1985); see also Powell v. Union Pac. R. Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“Section 631 broadly proscribes third party access to ongoing communications.”); Thomasson v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 321 Fed. App’x 557, 559 (9th Cir. 2008) (“California courts interpret ‘eavesdrop,’ as used in § 632, to refer to a third party secretly listening to a conversation between two other parties.”). 137 Judge Fisher believes that under Ribas, 696 P.2d 637, Google may be liable under Section 631(a) for recording the communications and sharing them with third parties. Judge Fisher does not write separately as it does not appear that California law is developed sufficiently on this question to reverse the judgment of the District Court. 138 Ribas, 696 P.2d at 640. 57